The main goal of the paper is to discuss various interpretations of the heritage created during the so-called 'partition' of Poland in the 19 th century and the ways of its possible reproduction. This goal will be achieved by analyzing patterns of Poland's electoral geography, which is known for its considerable stability. After a discussion of the historical background and a summary of the main patterns of the country's electoral geography, the main types of dominating interpretations of the reproduction of structures, brought about in the Polish space during the period of its partitions in the 19 th century, will be discussed. The paper will show how the recent transformation of the Polish political scene, which happened about 2005-2007, affected both the structures of the electoral geography and the dominant ways of its interpretation. As it will be argued, the above mentioned changes have emphasized the role of the East-West differentiation of the Polish space. The rise to prominence of that dimension was also related to the emergence of a number of new interpretations, many of which could be seen as heavily relying on orientalistic stereotypes, including those of the very negative images related to the heritage of the Russian rule. These mainstream interpretations, based on models of opposition between the positive Western "civilization" and the negative Eastern (Russian) "backwardness", will be confronted with what seems to be a more nuanced view on the basic East-West split of the Polish space. The proposed model will be an attempt to apply the theory of different types of capital by Pierre Bourdieu. In particular, Eastern Poland and its heritage of the Austrian and Russian rule will be presented as more cultural-capital oriented, while Western Poland and its heritage of the Prussian rule -as more economic-capital oriented. In this way the paper will propose a new, more general model of analysis of the spatial longue-durée effects. 
Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to discuss various interpretations of the heritage created during the so called 'partition' of Poland in the 19 th century and the ways of its possible reproduction. These questions are under constant discussion in contemporary Poland, both in academic and media debates. One of the main reasons for wide public interest in these theoretical issues is the regular reemergence of historical patterns in electoral maps in consecutive elections. After a discussion of the historical background and a summary of electoral geography patterns, this paper will discuss the main types of dominating interpretations of the phenomenon of reproduction of structures brought about in the Polish space during the period of its partitions. This will be concluded by a discussion of the heritage of the East-West differentiation of Polish space referring to the theory of different types of capital by Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1986) . That part of the paper can be considered to be a preliminary exploration of ideas on incorporation of Bourdieu's theory of capitals into the study of the longue durée effects in spatial variation in electoral outcomes. Let me remind that Bourdieu distinguished three fundamental forms of capital. First, economic capital is defined as command over economic resources and possession of financial assets. In addition to this, Bourdieu distinguished two other types of capital: social and cultural. Social capital, according to his definition, consists of relationships and networks of influence and support that people can tap into by virtue of their social position. It can be also defined as membership of formal and informal groups that gives privileged access to different types of resources. Cultural capital refers to explicit and implicit, formal and informal cultural competences. These include the skills with which parents provide their children when they develop the attitudes and knowledge that make the educational system a comfortable and familiar place where children can succeed easily. According to Bourdieu's definition, cultural capital appears as: the "embodied" state (personal character, life-style, ways of thinking, aesthetic taste, manners, etc.), the "institutionalized" state (formal educational qualifications, competences confirmed by credentials), and the "objectified" state (objects of cultural value, especially works of art). I would like to propose that these three types of capital are three relatively separate dimensions in the reproduction of social structures and, in effect, of spatial structures. Thus in the second part of the paper, after review of data and earlier interpretations, I will present an attempt to discuss the heritage of the partition period in Poland in the context of these three forms of capital. In particular, following eyal et al. (1998) who have shown how the different nature of social stratification systems could be described using the system of different types of capital developed by Pierre Bourdieu, I will argue that the regional differentiation of social structure in Poland can be theorized as a privileged status of cultural and social capital in the southern and eastern parts of Poland.
The period of partition as a key heritage in the Polish social space
As it has been already mentioned, observers of the Polish political geography are often impressed by the regularity of the 19 th century heritage reappearance on the electoral maps of the country. Let me briefly remind the key historical and geographical facts which define this heritage. The partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth started in 1772 with the first wave of annexations by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. A second wave took place in 1793 (Austria did not participate this time), and the final one came in 1795, when the Polish-Lithuanian "Rzeczpospolita" or Republic finally ceased to exist. It was, however, not until the Vienna Congress in 1815 when stable borders between the three empires were established. They lasted in an almost unchanged form for the next 100 years until, in 1914, the First World War suddenly erupted and Polish territories become the theater of Prussian-Russian and Austrian-Russian confrontation. [ Fig. 1] 
The heritage of the Prussian sector
The influence of the Prussian economic and administrative system, in this context, is usually considered as more positive than that of the Russian one. As zukowski (2004) points out, agriculture in the Prussian zone "was technically and organizationally modernized, and it relied on local credit, cooperatives, and self-aid associations. Competing with the local Germans, who were prominent in banks and bigger enterprises, and also enjoyed the backing of the Prussian state, Poles had to increase their efficiency and outdo their competitors. Especially food processing, breweries, crafts, and smaller industries made steady progress. In addition, a Polish middle class was making its appearance on a scale unknown in other parts of the partitioned country" (zukowski 2004) .
There is, nonetheless, another aspect of this situation. Prussian Poland, especially the province of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska), acquired a key regional role in supplying agricultural products to the Berlin metropolis and developed largely on the basis of agriculture and light industry. Thus, the development of the area was restricted, to a large extent, only to a primary economy in contrast to the Russian part of Poland. Even if the agricultural sector's developmental level was high and modern infrastructure of all sorts (from transportation to sewage systems) had been developed concurrently, Greater Poland was, if compared to other Prussian regions, not developing on a level proportionate to its potential capabilities. Janusz Hryniewicz (Hryniewicz 2004 ) has even argued that the period of partitions slowed down the development of Polish lands under the Prussian administration, foremost among them being the region of Wielkopolska.
Nevertheless, one should emphasize the uniqueness of the Prussian land reform, which started as early as 1823 and ended in the late 19 th century. It produced a pattern of mid-sized and large farms. The rural population surplus had been successfully absorbed by the developing industry and service sector in the cities of Wielkopolska and other urban centers of Prussia. Such successful transformation of the socio-economic structures of rural areas never happened under Russian and Austrian administration. This change is the source of the greatest and, possibly, deepest divide of the Polish economy, and as a result -of the social and political space until today. According to kazimierz waJda (waJda 1990), one of the crucial differences between the Prussian land reform and those implemented in Austria and Russia, is that the primary aim of the two later reforms was mainly political: the restriction of the Polish nobility's position in the region. In the case of the Prussian reform, the main aim was primarily economic: rationalization of the land ownership structure. As a result, the Prussian reform eliminated sources of tensions between the gentry and the peasants in Greater Poland. In effect, the petty peasants as well as their traditional villages practically disappeared from the region while their traditional villages which still dominate the landscape of the former Russian and Austrian zones of Poland. Consequently, no peasant parties emerged in the region in the 19 th century, and their base of support has been relatively weak until today. Socialist movements have been also weak in Greater Poland (in contrast to the Russian zone, in particular) as most of the social tensions with partial class-conflict aspects in the region were perceived as national conflicts between "German owners" and Polish workers or farmers.
The cultural and political dimension of the heritage of Prussian and German rule in contemporary Western Poland is even more ambiguous. While Germany was a relatively efficient state of law (Rechtsstaat), and the Polish population was exposed to a system of values favorable to capitalist development, the state was much more active in repressing manifestations of Polish national identity than, for example, Austria, and pursued its brutal policy of Germanization. Prussia, and later Germany, according to its ideologues, was supposed to be a "modern", culturally homogenous state (Kulturstaat) and Poles were widely considered as an obstacle to achieving this end. Interestingly, such a view has also been shared by one of the founding fathers of modern sociology -Max Weber (aBraHam 1991), who actively supported anti-Polish organizations like the Hakata (German Eastern Marches Society). The preponderance of such visions of German identity resulted in actions by the state directed against Poles in economic, political, and cultural domains. Fortunately, from the Polish point of view, most of these actions backfired and effected a strengthening of Polish national identity, Polish civic and political institutions, and a network of protection of Polish economic interests in Greater Poland. At the same time, zukowski argues that, in the Prussian zone, "in contrast to Russian, and less so, to Austrian partitions, Poles living under Prussian rule, were hardworking, disciplined, and marked by rigorous work ethic" (zukowski 2004) . This argument can, however, be countered by the fact that majority of Poles had been integrated into the German social system as farm or factory workers and all higher level jobs required fluency in German language and culture, which often resulted in Germanization as a result of upward social mobility. This mechanism was, in particular, reinforced by the fact that the Prussian/ German part of Poland was the only zone where no universities existed until the rebirth of the Polish state in 1918. Moreover, secondary education was conducted only in German. On the other hand, this was the only part of former Polish territories where, at the end of the 19 th century, practically the entire population, including the inhabitants of the rural areas, had been provided access to a well-organized universal primary education system and, in effect, became fully literate by the end of the 19 th century. The situation in this context was the worst in the Russian zone, where illiteracy in some rural areas was still a problem long after 1945. The state of affairs in the elementary education system was slightly better in Austrian Galicia. The positive legacy of the Prussian high quality elementary school system is often seen as having an influence on present day electoral behavior, in particular high electoral turnout in the former Prussian zone. However, some stereotypical theories explain the same fact in terms of the legendary "Prussian discipline". This explanation could be backed by an observation that the turnout in Greater Poland had also been the highest in the late communist period, when electoral absentia was the main form of expression of dissent. Some also interpret this as a manifestation of the spirit of loyalty to any state structures attributed to the region. At the same time, it is often emphasized that the former Prussian region enjoyed some democratic freedoms, especially in the last year of its existence, when Poles could elect their representatives in the Reichstag. The democratization of the Prussian state, however, was progressing at a slower pace compared to that of Austria, but at a higher pace compared to the democratization of Russia.
The heritage of the Russian sector
On the other side of the border, Russian Poland, as it was already mentioned, was the most Western province of the Romanovs' Empire. This fact appeared to be an advantage in the development of industrial centers in the region. Łódź is the best example of a large industrial city, an important center of the textile industry, famous for its industrial boom in the second half of the 19 th century and even in present-day Poland. Łódź developed mainly because of its location near the Prussian border. This allowed investors from Prussia to build factories not far from their native country and, at the same time, to have access to the enormous Russian market. In other words, the sudden emergence of the industrial growth axis in Łódź was possible only because of the division of Poland and the tariff policies of the Russian Empire. Most authors agree that the Russian sector experienced the most pronounced impact of the industrialization process during the 19 th century. One has, however, to note that it was restricted to a small number of centers (mostly Warsaw, Łódź and Dąbrowskie Basin around Sosnowiec) and much dependent on foreign capital. In general, the contrasts between urban and rural areas are much higher in the former Russian region than in any other part of Poland. This seems to be related to a more general pattern of contrast between Germany, with low urban-rural tension, and Russia, with high polarization between large metropolises and rural areas.
The development of industry in the Russian zone started in the early 19 th century under the relatively autonomous, so-called "Kingdom of Poland". The Russian part of Poland saw primary land reform implemented in 1864. At that time peasants were given property rights to their plots. As kocHanowicz noted "the enfranchisement was relatively favorable for peasantry, if compared either with the Prussian and Austrian reforms of the first half of the 19 th century, or the Russian reform of 1861. Not surprisingly -the motives were predominantly political. The reform was an answer to a manifest of the insurrectionist National Government ( January 1863) granting peasants full rights to the land. The Russian government wanted to neutralize peasantry by all means, and to punish the rebellious landed gentry as well. For the peasantry, the enfranchisement -together with better market conditions and some technological progress in the agriculture -led to the improvement of their economic situation, and to the rise of their demand for industrial products, particularly textiles" (kocHanowicz 2006) In contemporary Polish mainstream historical discourse, the Russian sector is usually ascribed the worst stereotype of the three sectors of divided Polish lands of the 19 th century. Russia left a legacy of corrupt administration, authoritarianism, and civilizational backwardness, which were often perceived as factors hampering the development of the region. The Russian Empire is viewed as one which left neither democratic traditions nor impressive technical infrastructure. It did, however, stimulate the emergence of left-liberal educated intelligentsia, a class or stratum of an ambiguous role with ambitions of preserving some of the values of the nobility and a frequent anti-system political orientation. The Russian sector gave Poland its most famous 19 th century poets, writers and the majority of its national heroes of this period, but that sector also had the lowest level of education and the least advanced process of nationalization of its large peasant population 1) . As economic historians point out, one of the 
The heritage of the Austrian zone
The former Austrian part known as Galicia is widely viewed in Polish discourse as the most "nationally developed" and "democratically mature" from the point of view of its historical experience. It was the first one to participate in almost universal elections. At the turn of the 19 th and 20 th centuries electoral laws were constantly democratized and political liberties extended, thus allowing for the diffusion of Polish culture, Polish political organizations, and the strengthening of national awareness. The Austrian zone was the only sector where Polish language was allowed at all levels of education from elementary schools to universities. Moreover, after the reform of 1868, Poles dominated all levels of selfgovernment in the province of Galicia.
However, Galicia's stereotype also includes a negative economic aspect. The region was one of the poorest and most peripheral parts of the Habsburg Empire. It inherited exceptionally bad farm structure and widespread rural poverty -all these factors lead to mass emigration to America. The land reform was conducted particularly ineffectively which led to lasting tensions between peasants and landlords. Despite the early discovery of considerable oil deposits in the second half of the 19 th century, the region was not able to profit from these assets and little industry emerged here until the early 20 th century. Exceptions included the Chrzanów Basin, Biała textile industry as well as the main urban centers of the region that is Lwów and Kraków. Among the positive aspects of the Austrian heritage was the development of primary, secondary, and university education. Modern bureaucracy is also often considered in this light. An interesting legacy of Austrian rule is the exceptional strength of the Catholic Church in the region. Let it be remembered that Austria was the only part of 19 th century Polish lands where no persecution of Catholic Church members took place, as Austria was itself a Catholic monarchy. The high level of cultural conservatism and religiosity made the former Austrian zone's image quite controversial in modern Polish academic and media discourse. As I have discussed with much more detail elsewhere (zarycki 2007), the perception of Galicia and its historical heritage is very much dependent on the analysts' own political and cultural orientation.
In short, if we adopt the point of view of the Polish left, the former Austrian zone appears as the "worst" part of Poland (e.g. Gorzelak and Jałowiecki 1996) . Its fundamental traits are parochialism, collectivism, authoritarian inclinations, and clericalism which turn the region into a heritage park of feudal, pre-modern Europe. Thus Galicia, from this point of view, with its conservatism, moral rigorousness, and traditionalism is considered unable to integrate with the modern societies of the European Union. At the same time, regional development conditions are seen as the worst in the country due to the inhabitants' tendency to think in ideological and moral terms rather than to use pragmatic and rational logic, supposedly prevailing in Western Poland. Because of its collectivism and the role of traditional social structures, Galicia, in this view, resembles the backward Mezzogiorno in Southern Italy in its most negative image (kukliński 2010).
On the other hand, from the Polish right's point of view, Galicia is usually depicted as the "best" part of Poland. As it has been asserted, the region has the longest democratic tradition in Poland. Moreover, as the conservative interpretation reminds us, the traditions of pre-Communist times are vivid in the region, which makes its inhabitants more adapted to a market economy and European integration than those in other parts of Poland. It is also usually emphasized that private property is something natural in the region. Many families retained their property over several generations. All these factors make people allegedly more independent and self-reliant. Strong religious traditions result in a high level of national identity, self-esteem, and high moral standards (e.g. maJcHerek 1995). Moreover, in the right's interpretation, the high level of religiousness in Galicia makes its people more responsible and law abiding, thus leading to the lowest crime rates in the country and creating strong social networks. As a result, the region is depicted as having the highest level of social capital and the best potential for self-organization. Thus, it is not surprising that, in this view, the conditions for regional development, in what is presented as the most resourceful and most European region of the country, are portrayed as nearly optimal. These positive interpretations can be linked to a popular idealization of the heritage of the Austrian Empire -often related to the myth of the peaceful multicultural 'MittelEuropa'. This is often the way that memories of Galicia are invoked in the region and symbolized by the portraits of the 'good old emperor' Franz Joseph (Bialasiewicz 2005) .
Interestingly, Galicia is the historical region which has been most often referred to in Polish debates on "contextual" or "ecological effects". Let me remind that the thesis on the importance of regional and local patterns of political behavior as crucial elements for the explanation of individual voting patterns was first presented by kevin cox in his seminal article "The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context" (1969) and later popularized by PeTer J. Taylor and ron J. JoHnsTon in their work "Geography of Elections" (1979) . One of their best known opponents was Gary kinG (1996) who argued in support of the restricted nature of ecological effects. His argument was largely based on examples in which differences in regional behavior could be explained by compositional effects, that is, by regional deviations of average values of selected individual traits of voters. In Poland it is Radosław MaRkowski who is among the most ardent proponents of the anticontextual approach pioneered by kinG. markowski argued that "there is nothing 'mysteriously rightist' in Galicja; rather the socio-structural composition of the electorate is different, with average age as the major factor which 'explains' the Galician phenomenon" (markowski 2006, 826) . I would argue however, that even if the "regional variable" can be eliminated in a statistical model of voting behavior by its substitution with relevant individual characteristics of survey respondents, the problem concerning the origin and nature of the geographic differentiation of average individual traits of inhabitants across regions remains a valid research question.
Electoral geography of Poland

The structure of the Polish political scene and its evolution
Electoral geography is widely considered to be the most remarkable dimension in which the lasting spatial structures of the partition period manifest their vitality. The geography of voting patterns in Poland has been the subject of numerous systematic studies (BaRwiński 2006; Jasiewicz 2009; kowalski 2000; zarycki and nowak 2000) . Below I will shortly discuss the most spectacular instances of the reappearance of 19 th century borders on contemporary electoral maps. First, let me present the structure of the Polish political scene and its evolution after 2005. As it has been already discussed, the two dimensional structure of the current Polish political scene was identical with the two dimensional structure of Poland's electoral geography in the period of 1990-2005 (Tworzecki 1996 ; zarycki and nowak 2000). In the 2001 elections, in which the post-communist SLD came in first, we can see cleavage structures characteristic for the entire 1990s
2) . The first factor was the clear rural-urban cleavage, while the second one was the so called "post-communist cleavage" (GraBowska 2003) , known also as the Polish variant of the leftright axis. In the 2005 election the post-communist left suffered a major defeat, while two right-wing, anti-communist parties -Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS) -emerged as winners (markowski 2006) . This didn't change the two-dimensional cleavage in logic described above. Only the escalation of conflict between the liberal, proWestern, and free-market oriented PO, on the one hand, and the conservative, euro-skeptical PiS, on the other hand, after they emerged as two major actors on the political scene following the 2005 parliamentary elections, led to a major change in cleavage structure in the 2007 elections (kRzeMiński 2009). The first factor, after a varimax variation, changes from rural-urban opposition into the PO vs. PiS axis, which is often interpreted as the lib-2) Results of the statistical analysis discussed in this paper are available in a working paper at the following location: http://www.iss.uw.edu.pl/zarycki/pdf/east-west.pdf eral vs. conservative factor or the Euro-enthusiasts vs. Euro-skeptics. The second factor can be interpreted as a fading old post-communist cleavage or as the left-right axis. It's worth pointing out that the new liberal vs. conservative factor emerging in 2007 dominates the scene by explaining as much as 53% of the variance before rotation. This seems to confirm the largely one-dimensional character of that election.
When we analyze the correlation between values of factor loading by gminas (in other words, the measure similarity of maps) for each of the elections, we can see that the 2005 factors are still relatively similar to the two cleavages in the 2001 election, which, as it has been mentioned, are almost identical with factors that emerged in all elections in 1990s. In contrast, the 2007 factors are not directly linked to the old factor structure. The first and dominating factor of the 2007 election, in particular when we analyze its relation to "old" factors without rotation, appears to be a product of the combination of both of these factors. It is correlated to them in a similar restricted way. The emerging liberal axis in the new cleavage structure appears to be located between (or cutting) the old "left" (in post-communist cleavage) and "urban" (in urban-rural cleavage) camps (see Fig. 2 ). The emerging conservative (Euro-skeptical) pole appears between the old "right" (anti-communist) and old "rural" poles. One can note that, while the varimax rotation doesn't considerably change the results of the 2001 and 2005 election matrixes, it clearly modifies 2007 outcomes. The factor structure after that considerable rotation of 2007 data appears to be again much more similar to the In any case, this evolution of Poland's political scene and electoral geography can be interpreted as a delayed effect of change in the geopolitical context. While the "old" dominating axis of the "rightleft" or post-communist cleavage could be interpreted as a pattern of reaction to Soviet domination over Poland, the "new" one can be seen as emerging in reaction to Western domination (zarycki 2011). Thus, while the "old" anti-communist option could be identified as peripheral in relation to Moscow as a symbol of the Soviet Union, the "new" conservative option could be labeled as peripheral in relation to Brussels as a symbol of the West. Analogically, the "old" post-communist camp could be seen as pro-central, while, in the new configuration, the liberal camp appears as the pro-central option (zarycki 2000).
Interpretations of electoral geography
Patterns in the period 1990-2005
Since, as previously mentioned, the structure of Polish electoral geography in the period of 1990-2005 had a stable two-dimensional form, it is possible to discuss it while referring to two synthetic maps. They represent the two dimensions of the Polish political scene discussed above. The first one is the symbolic "left-right" conflict, known also as the "axis of values". Here the main controversy concerns the attitudes towards the communist system. On one side of the axis we find the post-communist parties and candidates. The opposite side of the axis is occupied by the right wing, religious, traditionalist anti-Communist groups and candidates. The second dimension representing the so-called "axis of interests" relates to differences in views on the economic system of the country. On the one hand we have supporters of the liberal, free-market option and, on the other hand, we have the supporters of the agrarian option -redistributive policies of state, etc. Here the borders of the Russian Empire are discernible practically along the entire historical line of the current Polish territory. Generally, Western Poland is more urban and thus, economically more liberal, while the Eastern part of the country is more rural and, in effect, supports more socially oriented views with a stronger involvement of the state in the economy. If we start an examination of the map from the North, we see a clear difference along the former East Prussian border. Also, in Central Poland, the curve of the former border between Prussia and Russia is clearly visible. It becomes even sharper in the South, near the region of Silesia, as in the case of the first dimension of the political space. The difference between the former Austrian and Russian zones is also visible. [Fig. 5] Another insight into the political map of the country can be gained through a look at the map of the turnout (Fig. 6 ) which, especially in the case of parliamentary and presidential elections, is very sta- ble. Here, already at a first glance, we see the shape of the former Prussian sector. It is clearly the region of the highest turnout in Poland. Its borders in the East (with the former Russian zone) as well as in the West (with the former German territories) clearly follow historical lines. The former Prussian zone is not restricted only to the Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) region. It forms a long North-South belt from the Kaszuby region on the Baltic coast to Silesia on the Czech border. The turnout map permits us to recognize this shape along the entire area as the region of highest electoral participation in the country (with the exception of the largest urban centers).
Pattern after 2005
Let us look now at the new pattern of the Polish electoral geography after the transformation of the cleavage structure from a two dimensional to a one dimensional system. Figure 5 presents the map of the new liberal vs. conservative axis as it emerged in 2007 elections. The juxtaposition of the two previous maps resulted in a much clearer east-west pattern where the former Prussian zone and the former German territories (Silesia, Pomerania and Eastern Prussia) and former Eastern Prussia are contrasted with the former Austrian and Russian sectors with the obvious exceptions of large towns, non-Catholic regions (in particular, the Orthodox part of Podlasie or Protestant Cieszyn Silesia) and areas with considerable exchanges of population after 1945. The former German lands (or the so called Western and Northern Territories) represent the most liberal and secularized part of Poland. This translates into the highest levels of support for the liberal pro-Western camp and earlier considerable support for left parties, in particular, for former-communists. A similar effect to that observed in Western Poland can be also observed in other regions in Central and Eastern Europe where an exchange of population took place after the last war (zarycki 1999). In particular, in Czech lands, from which German population was expelled just after the war, in the post-Communist period we observe a similar propensity toward support of the post-communist parties, as well as those considered to be populist (kosTelecký 1994) .
Returning to present day Polish Northern and Western Territories, we can observe that they appear to be among the most ardent supporters of Polish integration with the European Union (wasilewski 2004). This is not surprising as the pattern of support of Poland's EU membership in the 2003 referendum was almost identical to the geography of the new liberal vs. conservative cleavage. This may be seen as a manifestation of a more general trend in these regions, namely that of orientation towards formal, institutional structures (in particular, the state) as a framework of social life rather than informal, family type circles still dominant in Eastern and Southern Poland. The level of turnout is, however, not the highest in these lands, rather, it is below the national average and parties considered as populist (e.g. Samoobrona) often gain their highest levels of support in this part of the country. One can note that a considerable internal spatial differentiation is visible inside these former German areas. A higher uniformity of settlers coming from single regions made Lower Silesia much more coherent in social terms, compared to other regions resettled after 1945 -in particular, Western Pomerania and former Eastern Prussia. The settlers coming to Lower Silesia were not only more homogenous, but also arrived predominately from former Austrian lands (Galicia). In effect, they transferred some of the characteristic traits of these regions, including their relative conservatism and religiosity, into their new areas of settlement (BarTkowski 2003) . Lower Silesia has, until today, a higher degree of population stability and is clearly more conservative than other parts of former German territories. One may also speculate about the influence of the structures of settlements abandoned by former German inhabitants. While Lower Silesia had a dense network of smaller and middle-sized farms, more similar to patterns observed in Eastern Poland, Pomerania and former Eastern Prussia, as mentioned above, were dominated by large Junker estates. While the Lower Silesian farms were largely taken over by Polish petty peasants coming from Eastern Poland and former Eastern Galicia, former Junker estates were turned into state farms and, in effect, a large population of rural proletariat working on such farms emerged in the region. Observation of these differences induced Jacek luBecki to form a hypothesis that "one should expect above-average and consistently high levels of electoral support for the successor parties in the regions that in pre-communist times were agrarian 'crisis' zones of latifundism and rural poverty and thus experienced communism as an era of unprecedented economic development" (luBecki 2004). luBecki was able to confirm this hypothesis of the long-lasting heritage of "latifundism" not only in Poland's example but also using data from several other post-Communist countries including Hungary and Russia. He concluded his study stating that "re-gions where communism built its own order on the pre-communist legacy of bitterness and poverty today show above-average levels of electoral support for the parties symbolically representing the communist system. This framework allows a contextual and historical understanding of regional variance in the successor vote" (luBecki 2004) .
The other side of the post-2005 dominant cleavage is constructed by the combined support of the more radical parts of earlier "anti-communist" and "peasant" camps, which had their respective major stronghold in the former Austrian and Russian zones. In effect, we are dealing today with a much more pronounced east-west pattern in Poland's electoral geography than earlier. Looking from the point of view of the liberal pro-Western camp, these interpretations are often simple: Western Poland is more liberal due to the stronger historical influences of the West (e.g. Jałowiecki 1996) . Eastern Poland, in contrast, had weaker Western heritage and stronger "bad" Eastern influences. In the conservative narration, the East appears as a mainstay of the "true" Polish identity, not distorted by the secularization and massive population movements in the early postwar years. However, one can also find references to Western heritage in that region, although that heritage is usually understood in its conservative, traditional aspects.
Types of capital as dimensions in the reproduction of spatial structures
Economic capital
The 19 th century was a crucial period for the development of modern states, modern nations, and modern economies. It was a period of national and economic modernization when the foundations of the development of modern structures of economy were laid all over Europe. It is thus not surprising that, given the diversity of the countries controlling the Polish territory, the development paths of particular Polish regions were often very specific and different. The most tangible aspect of the partition heritage can be seen in the economic space of the country. Here, the 19 th century borders are visible on several mapsmost clearly in the social and political sphere. Several examples could be adduced. First, let me take the case of per capita revenues of Polish communes. The former Russian zone (with the exception of larger cities) is, until the present day, much poorer than the rest of the country -especially when compared to the Prussian sector. Different measures of infrastructure density show a similar picture. Until recently, that is, till early 1990s, almost one hundred years after the outbreak of the First World War the railway network was still more dense on former Prussian and German lands than in the Russian sector 3)
. Similar differences are seen in different measures of living conditions such as the quality of housing stock, availability of apartments with water supply and sewage systems, etc. What is also important is that the Russian and Austrian sectors remain until the present day much more rural as regions than those of Western Poland. In the Polish context patterns of land ownership seem to constitute the most stable dimension in the reproduction of structures of social space. Thus, as it has been already mentioned, the farms in former Austrian and Russian zones are, on average, much smaller and less efficient, often oriented towards subsistence agriculture.
One can note that the Third Republic, as post-communist Poland is often called, despite the radical reform of the economic system, did not considerably influence the structure of land ownership with the main exception being the bankruptcy of state farms (PGRs) in former German territories. The lands of many of these farms had been already privatized but the large sizes of the farms were usually preserved. Thus, the structures of Polish agriculture remained largely intact after 1989. It is worth emphasizing that no political power administering Polish territories after the partition period was ever able to considerably reduce the fragmentation of land property, which reinforced the strength of identity and the political position of Polish petty peasants -in particular those residing in former Russian and Austrian sectors. The Second Republic's government embarked on a restricted program of redistribution of large estates among small peasants. The intention of Communist Poland was to nationalize all private farms, as did other countries in the Soviet Block. The first stage of the project was to nationalize large estates. It was fully implemented and the nationalized land had been, to a considerable degree, redistributed among "landless peasants" in order to legitimize the new Moscow-imposed government. This move further increased fragmentation of land ownership, particularly in the former Austrian and Russian sectors. At the same time, the domination of middle-sized farms in the former Prussian sector made 3) One has to note that recently most of the local railway lines in Western Poland have been dismantled or withdrawn from use effecting in equalization of the density of the railway network across entire country. most of the farms non-eligible for nationalization or partition. In this way the structure of land ownership in the region remained largely unchanged. Land was, however, mostly acquired and retained by the state in former German regions, which included the so called Western and Northern Territories. Subsequent attempts at collectivization of petty peasants' farms in the former Austrian and Russian zones appeared to be futile. The peasants, who accounted for over half of the country's population, actively resisted such attempts. The Catholic Church, particularly influential in South-Eastern Poland, unanimously supported the peasants' protests against the nationalization of farms. In this way Poland had become the only country in the Soviet bloc where private ownership of arable land remained and even prevailed. This gave the peasants of Poland relative independence from the structures of the Communist state and allowed them to retain their specific traditions and ways of life. Moreover, petty peasants were able to gain several privileges from the state including subsidized fertilizers and equipment as well as guaranteed prices and long term contracts for their products. The resulting structure of the geography of agriculture in Poland has been heavily influenced by the 19 th century political borders. The arable lands of the former Russian and Austrian zone remained in petty peasants' hands. Today, the former Prussian zone is dominated by large and middle-sized private farms, while in the former (pre-1945) German regions farms are, on average, large. This historically produced pattern of economic differentiation of the country seems to still strongly influence its electoral geography. The agrarian electorate consequently supports rather conservative and statist-oriented parties that promise to defend petty farmer's privileges. In the former Russian part of Poland, Polish People's Party (PSL) usually prevails in rural areas (with the major exception of the highly religious Podlasie region), while in the former Austrian zone, despite or because of its pre-communist legacy of strong independent peasant movements, conservative-right wing groupings usually gain the majority of votes. Inhabitants of rural areas in both regions appear to be, on average, the least enthusiastic regarding Poland's entry into the European Union. The EU was seen by them as another institution challenging their traditional ways of life. Finally, the farmers and small (land) holders have managed to find their place in the new realities after EU accession and their political position has remained strong. This makes the prospect of a reduction in the crack between the rural, conservative East and the liberal, urbanized West on the map of Poland very unlikely.
Social capital
Now let me briefly discuss the patterns of distribution of social capital. I will refer in this place to a distinction between its bonding and bridging forms introduced by roBerT PuTnam, who suggested that the long-lasting structures of Italian geography, including electoral geography, were defined in the dimension of social capital (PuTnam 1993). While it seems quite difficult to assess the level at which longterm spatial structures in Poland have been defined and reproduced, dependencies between the regional differentiation of social capital and voting patterns have been established. As Paweł swianiewicz and Jan HerBsT (swianiewicz et al. 2008 ) as well as JaRosław działek (2014) have shown, the two basic dimensions of social capital have a largely opposite geographical differentiation in the Polish space. At the same time, they appear to be highly related to the left-right dimension in Poland's electoral geography. Thus, the geography of bonded social capital (that is, close social networks usually of family character) is similar to the support of the conservatives in the Polish political scene. In other words, Southern and Eastern regions stand out in this dimension although the former Prussian Wielkopolska also has relatively high scores of bonded social capital. It is very clearly related to levels of religiousness. On the other hand we have the so-called bridging social capital which is based on trust for all members of civil communities, irrespective of their origin and family relationships, as well as on trust in formal institutions. The highest scores of bridging social capital are found in the former German territories in the West and North of Poland. This can be linked to their relative secularization and to the weakness of traditional communities which have been based on informal social networks that have been developed for several generations. In these regions, involvement in non-governmental organizations serving interests wider than those of small local communities is higher than elsewhere in Poland, and social life seems much more formalized and "rational" than in Southern and Eastern Poland, where "pre-modern" social networks seems to endure subsequent political and economic transformations.
Cultural capital
Another important social asset that may be seen as a dimension in the reproduction of social and spatial structures is what Pierre Bourdieu called "cultural capital". It's worth noting in this context that Western Poland (in particular, the province of Greater Poland or Wielkopolska) had historically a relatively lower number of nobles (landed gentry) than other parts of the country, in particular Mazovia -even long before the partitions of Poland. On the other hand, cities grew faster and their network was denser in that region; thus, the number of burghers was consequently higher than in remaining parts of the country. The 19 th century saw a transformation of a large part of the poorer landed gentry into an educated urban stratum called the intelligentsia, which could be seen as a Central-Eastern European substitute for the middle class (szelényi 1982) . That process, which is usually considered as largely specific to this part of Europe, originated due to a number of factors: land expropriations (especially in the Russian sector where Poles have been often punished in this way for their rebellious actions and attitudes), restricted access of ethnic Poles to positions in the state administration of occupying powers, and, last but not least, underdevelopment of industry and cities (Gella 1976) . Lower numbers of landed gentry in the region of Greater Poland could have also translated into smaller population and lesser importance of the traditional intelligentsia in the region, although the institutional developments in the 19 th century seem to have played a crucial role. Let me remind in particular that the Prussian zone of partitioned Poland, as mentioned earlier, was the only part of the Polish lands where no single university-level institution existed until the resurrection of the Polish state; the first university in Poznan did not open until 1919. Yet, it was the Prussian part of Poland where the most efficient and universal system of elementary education was created. Illiteracy was practically eradicated by the late 19 th century. Greater Poland, just like the rest of Prussia, also saw the development of a network of professional schools. These schools have been very helpful in turning peasants into workers in large farms, light industry and services in the region, and in heavy industry in other Prussian industrial centers. On the other side of the border, universities in Russia (Warsaw and Wilno/Vilnius, but also in Tartu/ Dorpat, St.Petersburg and others where many sons of the Polish gentry studied) and Austria (Kraków and Lwów/Lviv/Lemberg, but also Vienna and others) were producing a stream of graduates, mostly overeducated from the point of view of the needs of the local economy and administration (Jedlicki 2008) . In this way, they supplied a constant influx of new members of the intelligentsia. At the same time, the classical gymnasia, for which both the Austrian and the Russian regions were known, have been, first and probably more importantly, elements of the mechanism that turned the Polish national elite from gentry into intelligentsia 4) . The transformation of the large part of the more affluent and active gentry into intelligentsia can be viewed in a Bourdieusian theoretical perspective as a conversion of social capital into cultural capital. The intelligentsia, as many of its critics point out, not only suffered from a constant deficit of economic capital (or more precisely, from an unusual surplus of cultural capital in relation to its restricted assets of economic capital), but also developed an ideology depreciating the value of economic capital. The prevailing type of intelligentsia identity emphasized a moral vocation for its members, a responsibility for the nation, and usually a need of a sacrifice for the benefit of the people (or the working class, in the leftist version of the intelligentsia identity, which has been generally less radical in Poland than in Russia) (walicki 2005) . The idea of sacrifice encompassed a cult of suffering, often in a direct sense, for example, in the capacity of victims of an unequal fight with foreign invaders. The roles of a businessman or a clerk was downgraded in this outlook, as businesses and state administrations usually belonged to the occupying powers and were not easily accessible for ethnic Poles . On the other hand, the sphere of culture and sciences, in particular humanities and arts, has become particularly valued as Polishness has been principally defined in the symbolic sphere of high culture and identity, with its main guardians being poets, writers, or painters. Bohdan Jałowiecki (Jałowiecki 1996) argued in this context that such an idealistic vision of Polish identity, in particular in the form that was developed by the Polish intelligentsia of the Russian zone, had been, to a large extent, imposed on the remaining regions of Poland; it dominated the institutionalized narratives of modern national identity.
4)
One may note that the intelligentsia has not been developing solely on the basis of former gentry members. It has been also absorbing people of other origin including former landowners, peasants, or Jews. On the other hand, part of the impoverished petty gentry, in particular outside large towns, has been gradually losing its status and not being able to join the intelligentsia, thus transforming into peasantry. Nevertheless, considerable part of the villages composed of former gentry members, in particular in the Podlasie region, retain their identity and distinction from nongentry neighbours until today (kowalski 2000; roGowskaauGusTynowicz 2008). 5) One has to note that Galicia after 1868 was an exception, while in the Russian zone only the highest administrative posts have been reserved for Russians (cHwalBa 1999).
One can note that the above described differences between the regions in terms of the role of the intelligentsia as well as the status of its identity can still be detected. One could try to relate them to the differentiations in the results of national high-school tests, which were introduced a couple of years ago into Poland's school system. Recent comparisons of average scores of students from different regions brought considerable surprises when they were first published (Bański et al. 2002; heRczyński and HerBsT 2002) . Taking into account the results from rural areas (there was no particularly significant difference between large urban centers, where results were usually above the national average irrespective of the region), differences between the former Prussian and German parts of the country, on the one hand, and former Russian and Austrian parts, on the other hand, emerged. Contrary to the expectations of many analysts, students in South-Eastern Poland are systematically scoring better than their peers in the Northern and Western parts of the country. Moreover, there is a noticeable correlation between voting for conservative parties (as PiS -Law and Justice and LPR -League of Polish Families) and higher test scores in the rural areas. Experts analyzed several hypotheses but no clear explanation of this intriguing outcome seems to be found so far (e.g. HerBsT 2009; Śleszyński 2004). One could speculate that the former Prussian part of Poland has been better integrated into the relatively more "modern" economic system represented by the Prussian state. However, as mentioned above, Poles have been functioning in this system on a relatively low level of social hierarchy and in a peripheral region -mostly in positions where no university level education has been required. In the context of the less modern societies of Russia and Austria, where modernity was not defined in such a direct opposition to Polishness as in Prussia, social 'rise' or conservation of previous social position for Poles was easier. At the same time, the Austrian and Russian societies, where not so much economic capital, but rather social capital (as defined by social origin) and cultural capital, inherited from family and gained by education, were decisive for defining social status and provided more incentives for pursuing education and investing in degrees -even degrees which did not directly translate into higher income or better position on the job market (Gella 1976) . If the hypothesis concerning the stronger influences of intelligentsia ethos and its wider population, especially of those of its members with a gentry origin, is justified, we could also assume that, to some extent, the regional differences in educational attainments can be explained by those factors. Some observations confirming the thesis regarding the stronger values of cultural capital in the social milieu of Southern and Eastern Poland have been provided by Jerzy BarTkowski (BarTkowski 2003). In particular, in the Western and Northern Territories (former German lands) BarTkowski noted a relative lack of interest in investment in real estate or generally -in economic, material capital in communities where the majority of inhabitants had familial roots in the former region of Austrian Galicia. At the same time, orientation towards education (cultural capital) was visible in these communities, for example in the form of a higher budget allocation for culture and education. Such cultural capital-oriented attitudes and indicators correlate positively, according to BarTkowski, with the number of settlers coming from Galicia and negatively with those originating in former Prussian territories where investments in material infrastructure are more privileged. Upper Silesia, bordering with the Dąbrowa Basin, is also a very interesting laboratory of the above mentioned processes. Functionally forming one industrial region, it actually constitutes two opposing and largely conflicted worlds (rosT et al. 2007 ). The former Russian controlled Dąbrowa Basin appears to be strongly left-oriented and secularized and also demonstrates higher school test results than neighboring cities with a heritage of Prussian administration. Upper Silesia is more conservative and religious, and shows, on average, slightly lower test results, which can possibly be linked to a historical absence of Polish intelligentsia in that region.
Conclusion
Thus, as we can see, the partition period left a legacy of division in Poland into a Western part -more pragmatic but less sophisticated in terms of cultural ambitions, and a South-Eastern partmore backward and rural in economic terms but having higher intellectual ambitions, possibly influenced by intelligentsia dominated social elites. The current configuration of the Polish political scene, which after 2005 has been dominated by liberals vs conservatives cleavage, has made this East-West division of the Polish space very visible. In Western Poland, the higher rate of urbanization and the smoother integration of the educated population into the modern German economic and social system translated into a lower percentage of intelligentsia in the 19 th century and a stronger bourgeois identity. Efficient larger farms which emerged after the Prussian land reforms reduced the role of petty peasants and were conducive to the development of a modern and competitive agricultural sector. On the other hand, the lack of universities in this region until 1918 prevented the production of overeducated graduates which would join the ranks of the national intelligentsia. In effect, a stronger middle class culture developed in the region with weaker presence of the influence of traditional Eastern European intelligentsia. Institutionalization of social life appeared stronger than in the east; more specifically, bridging (that is, mostly formalized) social capital played a greater role. Cultural capital today is also more important in its institutionalized pragmatic forms. In other words, economic capital seems to have relatively higher status in the logic of social stratification and reproduction, which makes this region more similar to a typical Western European society in terms of the model developed by eyal et al. (1998) .
Eastern Poland appears to have retained a logic of social hierarchy developed through different mechanisms and without strong German (Prussian) influences. However, the pre-partition heritage seems to also play a role in this region. A high number of gentry and, in particular, petty gentry, whose traditions are still alive in some regions until today, translated into numerous intelligentsia dominating in the symbolical social hierarchy of the region and imposing their idealistic ethos and life-style as norms of a higher class identity. One could speculate that the Bolshevik revolution had a stronger impact on the elite of Eastern Poland as it deprived most of the Russian-based Poles of their economic capital and real estate already by 1917. This could strengthen the role of the logic of status oriented, post-aristocratic forms of cultural capital as key dimensions in social structure, especially that of embodied cultural capital. This capital was transferred during family socialization rather than in formal academic institutions. There were also limitations to land reforms and their specific restricted forms under Austrian occupation. Russian and Soviet rule led to overpopulation of rural areas in Eastern Poland and to widespread subsistence farming. The economic weakness of agriculture in this part of Poland reinforced the role of traditional cultural capital as well as bonded social capital functioning with the support of the church as a compensatory asset for inhabitants of rural areas. In effect, the economic capital could be seen as having a relatively lower status in the logic of social hierarchies in the region 6) . Let me emphasize that the above discussion has been only a preliminary exploration of ideas on the incorporation of Bourdieu's theory of capitals into the study of the longue durée effects in spatial variations in electoral outcomes. To fully validate the hypotheses presented here, one would need to collect data allowing a direct correlation between diverse types of capital and political orientations. However, systematic and precise measurement of the resources of different types of capital as they have been defined here following Bourdieu, could be a challenging task. First, because of importance are not only their absolute but rather their relative assets (e.g., the fact of having much more cultural than economic capital typically defines intelligentsia members). Another challenge in this respect is that not only capital assets but also the importance assigned to them by particular individuals may be of relevance. Thus, an intelligentsia member can be economically affluent but will usually consider his or her economic assets of secondary importance compared to his or her cultural capital. Moreover, an adequate measurement of cultural capital may appear to be quite difficult. As Bourdieu himself has argued, its definition is always contextual and as the most recent studies prove it, it is constantly changing (e.g. annick Prieur and mike savaGe 2013). In the context of the culture of Central and Eastern European intelligentsia, of importance in this respect is not only formal education, or even the number of books, which are usually used as typical measurements of cultural capital (lewicka 2005), but also the mastery of the informal intelligentsia's ethos (zarycki 2009). Also those developing measures of social capital may face challenges, although progress in this field has been much greater so far. Still, many ambiguities remain concerning the role of religion and religious institutions. The Catholic 6) One has to emphasize that by referring to economic capital, the wider sphere of institutionalized social relations defining social status and career opportunities is understood. During the communist period private ownership of houses and farms persisted mainly in the Eastern part of Poland, while most of the real estate in Western Poland has been nationalized and collectivized. This, however, did not translate into marginalization of the role of social and cultural capital in Eastern Poland, because the private ownership scale was restricted and not integrated into a modern system of capitalist economy which normally sets the economic capital as the principal dimension of social prestige.
Church is undoubtedly one of the key institutions generating networks of social trust in Poland; their character is, however, difficult to assess and translate into measures of social capital. As evidence from other countries, for example Hungary (wiTTenBerG 2006), proves, the Catholic Church plays crucial role in the reproduction of social and political structures. In the case of Polish regions, however, its role may not be as obvious as it could seem. In particular, the level of religiosity still appears to be higher in the former Prussian region of Greater Poland than in the adjacent part of the former Russian sector, which in political terms appears to be more conservative. This seems to be just one of the challenges related to the task of developing a detailed map of Poland in terms of different types of capital.
